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Baxter: Western Water and the Reservation Theory - The Need for a Water Rights Settlement Act

NOTES
WESTERN WATER AND THE RESERVATION THEORYTHE NEED FOR A WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ACT
Federal-state water rights conflicts which have become apparent in
the last decade have created a great deal of concern among residents of
the West. Federal court decisions have served to becloud the status of
water rights, vested under state law, in a land where the certainty of this
real property interest is largely determinative of land value and productivity. The concern was ptompted initially in 1955 by the famous Pelton
Dam decision, FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). That decision instigated a desire, among westerners particularly, for clarifying legislation to
establish the limits of federal authority over waters. No broad-scope remedial legislation has been passed, and since 1955 there have been further
judicial pronouncements which make even more imperative the settlement
of water rights on a federal-state basis.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the major areas of conflict
in the light of the needs of the Western United States as those needs have
manifested themselves and developed historically. Legislative proposals
designed to solve the conflicts by creating a more unitary and functional
institution to better develop water resources will also be considered.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WESTERN WATER LAW
The common law of water courses in the United States is based upon
the riparian rights doctrine. The origin of this doctrine is traceable
through Kent and Story to the civil law of France and the Code
Napoleon.'
The first expression of the word "riparian" to describe rights in
watercourses is found in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 2 a case from which some inferences can be drawn as to the tenets of the riparian doctrine. Mr. Justice Story stated that the owner of land adjacent to a stream is entitled
to the land comprising the streambed, covered with water, to the middle
of the stream. By virtue of owning that land, he has a right to the use
of the water flowing over it in its natural condition, without diminution
or obstruction. Since no property is thereby created in the water itself,
no proprietor can use the water to the prejudice of another.8 From these
statements come the principles that the riparian theory is based upon
ownership of land and embodies protection of correlative rights. Such
a theory is perfectly suitable and equitable in the Eastern United States
where it was introduced, since that geographical area is characterized by
abundant rainfall and ample water supply.
'Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133, 139 (1919).
224

Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 14312)

(C.C.D. R.I. 1827).

'Id. at 474.
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On the other hand, the western portion of the United States, generally that land within the seventeen contiguous western states, is not
blessed with such an abundance of consumable water. In this part of the
country there are vast areas in which rainfall is slight, water extremely
valuable, and land virtually worthless unless there is available at least
an adequate amount of water to supply domestic uses.4
Under these physical circumstances western water law was developed.
It is not surprising, then, that western water law ultimately came to be
based upon beneficial use of water rather than correlative rights and the
appropriation theory rather than the riparian theory.
The seventeen western states were acquired by the United States
through purchase and treaty during the first half of the nineteenth century.5 This land was public domain of the United States and as such was
not open for shttlement or private acquisition until the passage of the
Homestead Act of 1862.6 For a decade preceding the Homestead Act
there had been continuous settlement in the West with a particularly
great influx of miners and settlers at the time of the California gold rush
in 1849. These miners were trespassers with no proprietary rights in the
public domain and extracted gold therefrom with only the implied permission of the United States. 7 As water was of critical importance to the
miners because of the mining techniques used, conflicts arose over rights
to use water as well as those concerned with the establishment of rights
to mine a particular claim. Eastern water law theories of riparianism were
not suitable to settle the disputes over water rights because riparian
rights are incident to ownership in land. Consequently, local judicial
bodies seized upon local customs of appropriation in an effort to peacefully resolve water rights disputes. Under the appropriation approach
the first to make a beneficial use of water was protected in that right to
the extent of his use. This is a simple application of the "first in time,
first in right" theory.
The doctrine of appropriation was soon seen to be peculiarly suitable
to the West. In 1855, the Supreme Court of California' recognized appropriation as the local custom and applied it as the law of the jurisdiction.
4

Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill
of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 604 (1957).
Water, even uncomplicated by Federalism, nurtures controversies which
are both long and bitter. Ever since western water rights were first
established in the mining camps of the Sierra Nevadas, it has frequently
been nip and tuck whether differences of opinion would be resolved by
briefs or by bullets.
5
Specifically, they were: the Louisiana Purchase, Treaty with Franch Republic, April
31, 1803, 8 STAT. 200; the Oregon Country Treaty, Treaty with Great Britain, June 15,
1846, 9 STAT. 869; the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty with Republic of Mexico,
May 30, 1848, 9 STAT. 922; and the Gadsden Purchase, Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30,
1853, 10 STAT. 1031. Note, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 967, 968 n.8 (1960). For a graphic
depiction of these acquisitions see BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICs 5 (1963).

12 STAT. 392, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1958).
75 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

734

(1962).

8
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The court held that the common law riparian doctrine could not be utilized because neither litigant had a proprietary right. Both were tenants
at will only. After the passage of the Homestead Act of 1862 this basis
for applying the doctrine of appropriation to the exclusion of the riparian
theory disappeared. The question of which of the two doctrines should
prevail if there were parties with a proprietary interest in land involved
came into issue and remained in doubt for some years. At least a few of
the first cases to thereafter face the problem gave the United States
patentees riparian rights rather than appropriative rights.9
The Congress of the United States by the passage of three very important acts made known its intent in regard to western water law. The
Act of 1866 was a federal legitimization of lode mining claims that had
been recognized by California laws. It provided:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes have
vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts,
the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same .... "
This act expressed the willingness of the United States to recognize
private appropriation of public water. By the Act of 187011 all United
States patents issued after that date were made subject to rights acquired
under or recognized by the Act of 1866. This act, in effect, stated that
appropriative water rights vested under the Act of 1866 could not be
defeated by the assertion of a riparian water right based on a subsequent
federal patent. The third act, the Desert Land Act of 1877,12 was primarily to encourage settlement and reclamation of parts of the arid
Western States. It authorized claims to tracts of desert lands with an
accompanying water right based on a bona fide appropriation for bene3

ficial use.1

The Supreme Court of the United States lent further credence to the
belief that Congress had, by the Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1877, assented to
the appropriation theory of water rights in contravention of the common
REv. 495, 496 (1957).
253, 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).

'Note, 5 UTAH L.
1014. STAT.

30 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
'All patents granted, or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and

1-16 STAT. 218,

accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such
water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by [the Act of
1866] . . . .

377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1958. Applicable to the states of California, Oregon,
and Nevada (Colorado was later added), and the territories of Washington, Idaho,
Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, and Dakota. These states were
virtually entirely open to Desert Land Act entries as the era of federal reservations
had not yet come into being.
1319 STAT. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1958). Also significant is the provision:
[A]ll surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use .
upon the public land and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes
Published
by ScholarWorks
at University of Montana, 1964
subject
to existing rights.
219 STAT.
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law riparian rule. Near the turn of the century the Supreme Court clearly
held that states were free to adopt non-riparian systems of water rights
4
and that such state legislation would be recognized under the acts.1
In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.15 the Court used
this language:
While [the riparian theory obtains in the states which have
adopted the common law] it is also true that as to every stream
within its dominion a state may change this common law rule
and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such
16
purposes as it deems wise.
Similarly, the decision in Kansas v. Colorado held the Colorado doctrine valid as applied in that state. In addressing itself to the conflict of
the riparian theory versus appropriation the Court said that "Congress
17
cannot enforce either rule upon any state.'
If there were any doubts remaining about the effect of the Desert
Land Act and the propriety of the states' adoption of the appropriation
theory they were completely laid to rest in the now famous decision of
California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.'s That
case involved an action to enjoin interference with or lessening the
volume of the Rogue River, a non-navigable stream in the state of Oregon.
The plaintiff had never made an appropriation of water from the stream
for a beneficial use but brought his claim solely as a riparian owner of
land taken by United States patent under the Homestead Act of 1862.19
Specifically, the defendant intended to dam and divert water in the
stream for a power plant to be located across the river from the plaintiff's land. Defendant obtained its construction permits and certain
adjudicated water rights from the state of Oregon. This squarly presented the issue of whether the homestead patent carried with it as part
of the granted estate the common law rights which attach to riparian
"Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545 (1903).
"174 U.S. 690, 702-03 (1898).
"The Court did note two important limitations on the power of the states to legislate
with respect to the rights of the United States:
[T]wo limitations must be recognized: First, that in the absence of
specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy
the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a
stream, to the continued flow of its water; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, that
it is limited by the superior power of the General Government to secure
the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits
of the United States. Id. at 703.
17206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907). This holding might seem all the more significant if the
substance of that doctrine is noted. The Colorado Doctrine is based on the theory
that full sovereignty to the waters was transferred to the states as they were formed.
This rationale would leave the federal government without any proprietary interest
in western waters and would deny the necessity of federal consent for a state adopted
system of appropriation. In any event, the federal government was thought to have
given its consent by the Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1877. Note, Federal-State Conflicts
Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 974 (1960).
"295 U.S. 142 (1935).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
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proprietorship. The Court held that such rights did not attach. In reaching that conclusion it very properly analyzed the history of western water
law.
The Court noted that the Acts of 1866 and 1870 were not meant to
protect only those appropriations vested under state law before 1866.
They reach into the future as well, and approve and confirm
the policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized
by local rules and customs, and the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and measure of private
rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the public domain. 20
And again in considering the language in the Desert Land Act of 1877:
If this language is to be given its natural meaning ...

it effected

a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore
appropriated, from the land itself. From that premise, it follows
that a patent issued thereafter for lands in a desert-land state or
territory, under any of the land laws of the United States, carried
with it, of its own force, no common law right to the water
flowing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed.2 '
The final holding of the Court has become classical in writings on western water law:
[F]ollowing the Act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable
waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris,
subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including
those since created out of the territories named, with the right
in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the common law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain.

22

Thus, in 1935, the doctrine of appropriation had been completely accepted. The states at this point had every reason to feel secure in their
ability to legislate as they chose in regard to the non-navigable waters
within their boundaries. It was settled that even government patentees
had only received land titles and had to acquire water rights in accordance with state law.
CONCURRENT FEDERAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF WATER WATER RESOURCES.
By virtue of original ownership of all the western lands the United
States at one time had plenary power over them and over water rights
that were an incident of this proprietorship. The period beginning with
the middle of the nineteenth century and the Homestead Act of 1862,
-295 U.S. 142, 155 (1935).
t

1d. at 158.

Published
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however, was an era of surrender of federal rights. This was demonstrated by the Acts of 1866 and 1870, and the Desert Land Act of 1877.23
Congress during this time had emphasized and encouraged the settlement
and development of the western lands by individuals. But, near the end
of the nineteenth century it became apparent that leaving reclamation to
24
private development under the Desert Land Act was not successful.
It was also apparent that the public land generally was being rapidly
decimated and the natural resources destroyed. These considerations
caused the federal government to undertake conservation and relamation programs of its own.
These programs began shortly after the turn of the century and
largely took the form of vast federal reservations of that which had
previously been public land. In 1906, the President was authorized to
establish national monuments. 25 The Pickett Act of 191026 withdrew all
known public oil lands. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 authorized withdrawal of the unappropriated public domain for reclassification.2 7 The
government undertook to develop facilities to reclaim arid lands by the
Reclamation Act of 1902.2 s The Federal Power Commission was created
and authorized to license private power projects by the Federal Water
Power Act of 1920.29 The Flood Control Act of 1944 provided for con30
struction of multi-purpose water projects.
As a result of the federal government's efforts to reserve and reclaim the western lands after the beginning of the conservation era
national forests, national parks, national monuments, defense establishments and Indian reservations were withdrawn from those lands open
to public settlement. These withdrawals which began around the turn
of the century constituted, as of June 30, 1963, a total of 360,789,045
acres in the eleven contiguous western states.31 This places under the

aMartz has categorized three periods in the development of western water law. Period
One is the period of sale (from the Revolution to 1850), Period Two is the period
of exploitation and development (from 1850-1900) and Period Three is the period of
). Martz, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 2-11 (1951).
conservation (19002
Ibid. That extensive reclamation was never accomplished under the Desert Land Act
is further born out by statistics. A total of less than 101/2 million acres (10,451,125)
have been entered under that Act from March 3, 1877, to June 30, 1963. BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 61 (1963).
2 3 4 STAT. 225 (1906), 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1958).
a 3 6 STAT. 847, 37 STAT. 497 (1912), 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-142 (1958).
1748 STAT. 1269, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1958).
1132 STAT. 388, 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
Percentage of total state
241
STAT. 1077, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1958).
acreage owned by federal
258 STAT. 887, 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1958).
government
a
44.764
.....................................
Arizona ...............
44 .521
....................................................
C alifornia ----------------------------------35.968
..........................................................................................
Colorado
64.601
..............................
Idaho ........................
29.677
Montana ..................................
85.459
Nevada ..................................
34.912
N ew M exico ..................................................................................
51.899
O reg on ..............................................................................................
68.361
.....................
U tah ......................................................................
29.477
W ashington .....................................................................
48.238
Wyoming . ........................................................................................
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
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responsibility of agencies of the United States approximately 48 per
cent of the total acreage within those states (with the exception of
North and South Dakota) included in the Desert Land Act. Although
many of the federal reservations do not themselves directly concern the
control or development of water resources, they are all to some degree
dependent upon water for their operation and maintenance. As the
withdrawal of public lands provides the basis for the reservation theory,
it is important to appreciate the increased concern of the federal government with western water during this period and the ultimate magnitude of the withdrawal of the public domain.
Even with greatly increased federal activity in the western states,
a study of the federal enactments providing for these projects would
prevent any concern on the part of the state legislatures as they seem
to demand compliance with state law. Both the Reclamation Act of 1902
and the Federal Power Act of 1920 provided that nothing in those acts
should interfere with state laws relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water, or any vested right acquired thereunder,
and that the federal government should proceed in conformity with state
laws.3 2 The Flood Control Act of 1944 33 provided that the use for navigation should be only that use that did not conflict with a beneficial use,
present or future, in the states lying west of the ninety-eighth meridian.
A preference was thereby given to beneficial, consumptive uses over
non-consumptive uses in a land wholly dependent upon water for its
34
habitability.
Throughout this period it was customary for the federal government
to appropriate water in accordance with state laws.3 5 It is important to
realize, however, that the government's claim to riparian rights was never
36
relinquished, even during the era of federal deferment to state law.
EMERGENCE OF THE RESERVATION THEORY AND OTHER
AREAS OF CONFLICT.
Congress had complete legislative jurisdiction over the public domain of the West from the time of its acquisition, even though it encouraged state control and development of western water for a half century. Although it was not used actively, there was, in conjunction to the
federal jurisdiction, a proprietary power similar to that enjoyed by a
"Reclamation Act of 1902, § 8, 32 STAT. 390. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1962); Federal
Power Act of 1920, § 27, 41 STAT. 1077, 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1952); Federal Power
Act of 1920, § 9(b), 41 STAT. 1068, 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1958).

'58 STAT. 887, 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1958).

3

For an exhaustive list of federal statutes demanding compliance with state laws
respecting water rights see Corker, supra note 4, at 613 n.27; Hearings on S. 1275
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1275].
' 5Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L. REV. 626,
633 (1957).
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private landownerY When the federal government chose to no longer
defer control over the western waters, authority was found for its reclamation and conservation programs under five different clauses in the Con40
stitution.3 8 They are the commerce clause, 39 the property clause, the gen43
42
41
The exereral welfare clause, the war power, and the treaty power.

cise of authority over western water resources sustained by the Constitution has given rise to some very perplexing areas of conflict over water
rights. The greatest controversies deal with the government's assertion
of a paramount proprietary interest in derogation of state law, the
emergence of the reservation theory, the ability to take private water
rights vested under state law without compensation in one circumstance,
and the practice of seizing property without proceeding by the usual,
orderly process of condemnation.
Although the Pelton44 decision was not the first case in which the
United States asserted its supremacy over the states in matters concerning western waters or its paramount proprietary interest in western lands,
it is one of the cases that has created the most consternation among those
considering federal-state water right conflicts because it provided a
definite emergence of the reservation theory. In the Pelton case, a
license to construct and operate a hydroelectric plant on reserved lands
of the United States45 adjacent to the Deschutes River 46 in Oregon was
issued to a private power company by the Federal Power Commission.
The state of Oregon, the Fish Commission of Oregon, the Oregon State
Game Commission and an interested private group questioned the authority of the Commission to issue the license. They also questioned the
efficiency of the Commission approved facilities for conserving anadromous fish. The state and its agencies had prevailed in the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit where it was held that Congress, by its public lands
legislation, had transferred to the state of Oregon control over the nonnavigable waters and that permission prescribed by the state was necessary for granting the license. 4T On certiorari, the Supreme Court found
the Commission within its discretion in granting the license.
87United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).

"See King, Federal-State Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. DET.
L. J. 1 (1959).

CONST. art. I, § 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824); United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); United States v.
Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
"U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
"U.S.

U.S. 690 (1899);
"U.S. CONST. art. I,

FPC v.

Oregon, 349

U.S.

435

(1955).

§ 8; United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950);

Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Ashwander v. TVA; 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
"U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
"FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
4"The western terminus of the dam was to be located on an Indian reservation,
reserved by the United States for power purposes since 1910 and 1913. The eastern
terminus was on lands withdrawn for power purposes since 1909.
"The Deschutes River flows entirely within the state of Oregon. For the purposes of
this case it was treated as non-navigable.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
-1211 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1954).
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The Court, in reaching its conclusion, considered three issues. Initially, they found the Federal Power Act applicable, comparing the instant situation to the First Iowa tIydro-Electric Co-op v. FPC case, 48
in which the Federal Power Commission was held to have authority to
license a power project on a navigable river in Iowa without evidence
of compliance with state law. The jurisdiction of the Commission in
the First Iowa case was provided by the navigation servitude of the commerce clause while in the Pelton case it was based on the United
States' ownership of its reserved lands and the property clause of the Con49
stitution.
It was in this determination that the highly significant distinction
was made between "reservations" and "public lands." 50 The Court said
"328 U.S. 152 (1946).

The First Iowa case is of consequence for several reasons. It
squarely faced the issue of whether the applicant for a license had to present
evidence of compliance with the laws of Iowa. The Court concluded that to require
the granting of a state permit as a condition precedent would give Iowa a veto
power over federal projects, destroying the effectiveness of the Federal Power Act.
The Court found the purpose of the Federal Power Act to be the development
of idle water resources while avoiding unconstitutional invasion of state jurisdiction.
This was to be accomplished by dividing the Constitutional powers, leaving the states
with their traditional jurisdiction subject to the superior right of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, administer public lands and reservations, and
exercise authority under treaties of the United States. The federal government has
superseded the states in projects over which the Federal Power Act has jurisdiction
and only it has final authority.
For those states which were laboring under the misconception that sections 9(b)
and 27 of the Federal Power Act were put in the Act to insure state control over
waters and federal compliance with state law, the court had a carefully analyzed
explanation. Section 9(b) provides: "That each applicant for a license hereunder
shall submit to the commission. . . (b) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has
complied with the requirements of the laws of the State. . .. ." This language literally
seems to require proof that the applicant has complied with state law. The Court
reasoned, however, that since the Federal Power Act has preempted state law in this
field, section 9(b) taken in context gives the Federal Power Commission the authority
to demand evidence of compliance if it desires that evidence but the state permit
isn't actually needed. The Commission may require only such compliance with state
statutes as it deems material because 9(b) only requests legal, a opposed to factual,
information and does not itself require compliance with state laws. Section 27 was
explained as being enacted as a "saving" clause so that the act would not be stricken
as an unconstitutional invasion of state jurisdiction. It provides:
That nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending
to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective
States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein.
The Court limited its effect "to laws as to control, appropriation, use or distribution
of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature."
"Other
uses" does not give general protection to state laws as it was construed as being
ejusdem generis with the words ''irrigation'' and ''municipal.''
It can be seen that this case served to preempt the field in licensing power
projects and in removing any presumed protection for the states under sections 27
and 9(b) of the Federal Power Act.
"The Federal Power Act of 1920, § 4, 41 STAT. 1065, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1958),
expressly gives the Federal Power Commission authority to issue licenses for projects
"upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States ...
"
'For a note indicating that such a distinction might have been anticipated because
of Court decisions considering United States control of water flowing through Indian
Reservations see Note, Indians, Water, and the Arid Western States-A Prelude to
the Pelton Decision, 5 UTAH L. REV. 495 (1957). These cases recognized the right
of the United States to control water passing through the reserved lands in accordance
with the purpose of the reservation. In several cases open end decrees were granted
so that the appropriation of water could be increased with the growing needs of the
Indians
on the reservation.
Published
by ScholarWorks
at University of Montana, 1964
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that each term had its established meaning in the Federal Power Act:
"Public lands" are lands subject to private appropriation and
disposal under public land laws. "Reservations" are not so subject. .

.

.Even if formerly they may have been open to private

appropriation as "public lands," they were withdrawn from such
availability before any vested interests conflicting with the
Pelton Project were acquired. 51
The Court then stated that there was no question constitutionally of the
Federal Power Commission's authority to license power projects on reserved lands of the United States, provided that "the use of water does not
conflict with vested rights of others.

' 52

Oregon's argument that the Acts of 1866, 1870, and the Desert Land
Act of 1877 had conferred power upon the states to regulate non-navigable water was then summarily dismissed:
It is not necessary for us . . .to pass -upon the question whether

this legislation constitutes the express delegation or conveyance
of power that is claimed by the State, because these Acts are
not applicable to the reserved lands and waters here involved.
The Desert Land Act covers "sources of water supply upon the
public lands. . . ." The lands before us in this case are not "public
lands" but "reservations.

53

The Court finally concluded after reviewing the provisions made for
reregulation of the stream and the preservation of anadromous fish that
the Federal Power Commission had acted within its discretion in granting
the license.
Notably lacking in the Pelton decision is a consideration of the historical development of the West and its great dependence on water, found:
54
so vital to the Court's deliberations in the Beaver Portland Cement case.
This obvious omission caused Mr. Corker to comment: "Perhaps the most
basic criticism [of the Pelton decision] is that the Court ignored a century of experience with western water rights which has demonstrated that
the riparian right is ill suited to a region where water is the limiting
5
factor in land development." '

The Pelton decision was disconcerting to the western states within
the narrow limits of its holding. Of even greater concern is the cloud of
uncertainty cast over a much broader pertion of western water rights
than merely those affected by the ability of the Commission to grant a
license for a hydroelectric project on reservations of the United States
without securing the permission of the states. That the decision might
have far reaching and devastating results was immediately considered and
"Supra note 44, at 443-44.
5
2Id. at 445.
'Id. at 448.
5

tSupra note 18.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
'Supra note 4, at 613.
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condemned by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Pelton.
He contended that the act which provided for the withdrawal of public
lands did not intend to affect water rights or change the provisions of
the Desert Land Act pertaining to water rights:
I assume that the United States could have recalled its grant of
jurisdiction over water rights, saving, of course, all vested rights.
But the United States has not expressly done so; and we should
not construe any law as achieving that result unless the purpose
of Congress is clear.
The reason is that the rule adopted by the Court profoundly
affects the economy of many states. .

.

. If by mere Executive

action the federal lands may be reserved and all the water rights
appurtenant to them returned to the United States vast dislocations in the economies of the Western States may follow. 6
Other questions which are vital to a determination of the validity of
water rights vested under state law are also raised but are undecided by
the Pelton case. Has Pelton served to introduce a concept of federal
riparian rights into the West, based on the initial United States' ownership of those lands 57 How much water was reserved by the United States
for its various reservations? Is it to be an indeterminate amount, always
subject to increase when the United States desires to take more water
for reservation development?58 If as much water is reserved as is necessary for the purpose of the reservation, what is the date of priority for
the federal right? Is the date as of the time of beneficial use, as of the
time of initial reservation of land, or does it date back to the United
States' sovereignty prevailing at the time of cession? Further, what state
control still obtains and what is the relationship between federal and
state water rights?
Judicial expressions were soon forthcoming which served notice that
the apprehensions about Pelton were not mere idle fantasies. Suspicion
that the reservation theory might be seized upon to justify broad protection for government use of water to the possible detriment of appropriators under state law was soon confirmed. In fact, applications for
water rights were being made by the Navy in accordance with Nevada
statutory procedure when Pelton was handed down. As a result of the
pronouncements in that case the applications were dropped and the Navy
chose to rely on its right to take groundwater from wells located on a
United States military reservation without permission from the state
of Nevada. Nevada ordered compliance with state law or discontinuance
of use of water from the wells and sought declaratory relief. The United
States District Court in Nevada ex rel. Shamburger v. United States50
'Supra note 44, at 456-57.

5

Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?, 36 ORE. L. REV. 221 (1957).
'See the holdings of the Indian reservation cases, supra note 50.
1165 F.
600 (D. at
Nev.
1958).
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held that Nevada could not enjoin the federal government from using
water of its wells because of noncompliance with state law dealing with
appropriation and use of water. The court found authority for its decision
in the reservation theory promulgated in Pelton, in the paramountcy of
of the national government within the scope of its delegated functions, 60
in the ability of the national government to provide conditions appropriate for the accomplishment of the objectives of its projects,61 and in
expediting national defense.
The vice of the decision is not that the United States exercised its
constitutional authority to provide the water necessary to make its military reservation functional. Rather, it is that the government chose to
proceed in a manner that affords no protection for other users nor any
certainty to the amount of water appropriated. The Hawthorne Naval
Depot withdraws water from the same underground basin as does the
city of Hawthorne. As there is no federal groundwater law providing
protection for a common source of supply 62 may not the federal government at some future date simply withdraw all the water it may deem
necessary to an increased need on the reservation and eliminate the source
of water for the city of Hawthorne?
The principal fear raised by Pelton, that the United States would
claim an appropriation priority as of the date of reservation on all previously unappropriated water arising on or flowing through federal
reservations, was promulgated as law by the Supreme Court in 1963 by the
6 3
decision in Arizona v. California.
In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Project Act 6 4 was passed. It authorized

the Secretary of Interior to construct a dam and other works on the Colorado River "to control floods, improve navigation, regulate the river's
flow, store and distribute waters for reclamation and other beneficial uses,
and generate electrical power."'65 This vast project would so help to control the river flow and impound flood waters on the Colorado River as to
make great quantities of additional water available for irrigation and sustained consumption. As the "first in time, first in right" 66 principle of
appropriation obtains in the West, concern was created among the northern Colorado Basin states that fast-growing California would appropriate more than its fair share of the new water supply. An action was
4
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
aIvanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).

6

supra note 4, at 623.
-373 U.S. 546 (1963).
445 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1958).

"Corker,

"Supra note 63, at 560.
"This principle was nicely stated in the first case entitled Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423, 459 (1931):

To appropriate water means to take and divert a specified quantity thereof
and put it to a beneficial use in accordance with the laws of the State
where such water is found, and, by so doing, to acquire under such laws, a
vested right to take and divert from the same source, and to use and consume the same quantity of water annually forever, subject only to the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
right of prior appropriators.
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brought by the state of Arizona against the state of California to determine how much water each state had a legal right to use out of the waters
of the Colorado River and its tributaries. Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and
the United States later joined as parties.
The basic issue of the case was resolved by the finding that the
scheme of apportionment contained in the Boulder Canyon Project Act
was controlling and that the United States was not bound by the theory
of equitable apportionment or by state law in disposing of the water. Of
great importance was the Court's consideration of claims by the United
States to waters of the Colorado and its tributaries for use on Indian
reservations, national forests, recreational and wildlife areas and
other governmental lands and works. The Court noted that the Special
Master had declined claims relating to tributaries while allowing most of
the others. They approved his findings almost entirely, discussing those
relating to Indian reservations. Rights had been asserted by the government to waters of the mainstream of the Colorado on behalf of five Indian
reservations established by acts of Congress and executive orders from
1865 to 1907. It was found, as a matter of fact and law, that when the
reservations were created enough water was also reserved to irrigate the
irrigable portions of the reserved lands. Over contrary contentions of the
state of Arizona, the Court held that the doctrine of equitable apportionment was inapplicable, that the United States was authorized to reserve
water for its reservations and property by the property and commerce
clauses, and that such reservations could be created by exeuctive order
as well as by acts of Congress.
In contrast with the approach in Pelton, special attention was paid
to the historical needs of the Indians, the nature of western lands, and
the absolute necessity of an adequate water supply for irrigation. The
Winters decision 67 was followed with the Indian water rights being adjudged effective as of the time the reservations were created. As these
rights became vested before the Boulder Canyon Project Act was passed
they were entitled to priority under the act. Similarly, the Master's conclusion concerning the quantity of water reserved was approved:
He [the Special Master] found that the water was intended to
satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian
Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved to irrigate all the practically irrigable acreage on the reservations.
...How many there will be and what their future needs will be
can only be guessed. We have concluded . . . that the only feas-

ible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations
can be measured is irrigable acreage6
The principles propounded for Indian reservations were then found
"Supra note 50. Winters v. United States, 143 Fed. 740 (9th Cir. 1906), is the leading
Montana decision concerning water rights and Indian reservations.
6Supraby
note
63, at 600-01.at University of Montana, 1964
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"equally applicable to other federal establishments such as national recreation areas and national forests." 69
By this decision the worst fears of the western states were confirmed. There is no longer any doubt that the United States intends to
assert a vested right to enough water to fulfill the ultimate needs of all
its reservations with a priority as of the date of the creation of the reservation itself.
LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL-STATE
WATER RIGHTS.
The Pelton decision created agitation for legislation which would solve
the problems caused by the concurrent assertion of two inconsistent bodies
of law applicable to western water. A number of subsequent decisions
have made even more apparent certain areas of conflict. Of course, where
the position taken by state law is inconsistent with federal legislation, the
federal law must control.7 0 The proper way to avoid the perpetuation and
magnification of the present problems is to modify the federal position by
new legislation. Such a modification should be directed not toward
stifling the federal government's constitutional authority to act in the
field of water law, but rather toward providing a fair solution to the
present problems, a clear manifestation of certain rules by which the
development of water resources must be guided, and the placing of a very
critical resource, one which is not physically amenable to complete control by a single, existing governmental unit, under the control of as nearly
uniform system of laws as is possible.
Consideration should be given to a recently proposed act designed to
solve federal-state water rights disputes.7 1 This proposal should be looked
7

'Id. at 601.
1U.S. CONST. art.

VI.

IS. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. Subject to the exceptions stated in section 5, the withdrawal or reservation of surveyed or unsurveyed lands of the United
States, heretofore or hereafter made, shall not affect any right to the use
of navigable or nonnavigable water acquired pursuant to State law either
(1)
before the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation, or
(2)
after the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation, unless,
in the latter event, a Federal statute, or an officer of the United States
authorized to make such a withdrawal or reservation, shall have promulgated the purpose, quantity, and priority date of the water right reserved
to the United States or otherwise established under its own laws, and such
promulgation shall have antedated the initiation of the conflicting right
under State law.
SEC. 2. Any right to the diversion, storage, distribution, or use of
water which the United States or those claiming under the United States
assert to have been established under the laws of a State shall be neither
greater nor less than those accorded by the laws of that State to uses
of water by others than the United States (including the State itself) in
like circumstances, and shall be initiated and perfected in accordance with
the procedure established by the laws of that State; Provided, That this
section shall not affect any authority which the United States may have
to establish water rights under its own laws, heretofore or hereafter
enacted.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
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to both because it demonstrates the present major areas of conflict and
because enlightenment of the citizens of the western states will aid in
obtaining passage of remedial legislation.
S. 1636, introduced by Ser:ator Kuchel of California, was drafted by
the Senator in collaboration with an expert water lawyer, Northcutt Ely,
Chairman of the Water Resources Committee of the Section of Mineral
and Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association. This bill
is desirable because it permits the federal government to continue deSac. 3. No vested right to the diversion, storage or use of any
waters, navigable or nonnavigable, acquired under the laws of a State and
recognized by the laws in force as of the effective date of this Act in that
State as being compensable if taken or used by or under the authority
of the State, shall be taken or used by or under the authority of the United
States without just compensation. ''Vested right'' shall mean either (1)
an appropriative right initiated in accordance with the general laws of
the State applicable to the appropriation of water rights, which has been
exercised either by the commencement of actual diversion, storage or use
of water, or by the commencement of construction of works for such purposes, and which is thereafter maintained with reasonable diligence in the
completion of such works and application of water to such purposes, or
(2) a riparian, overlying, or pueblo right, to the extent that such laws of
the State recognize such rights, or (3) a prescriptive right or any other
water right to the extent that water has been put to beneficial use.
SEC. 4. If works hereafter constructed by or under the authority
of the United States impair or interfere with the utilization of any right
to the diversion, storage, or other use of water which is vested and compensable under section 3, and if agreement with the owner of said right as to
the compensation due for such impairment or interference has not been
reached by the time of the initial interference with such right, the United
States shall initiate and diligently prosecute proceeding to condemn the
same under appropriate Federal or State laws of eminent domain. If it
shall fail to do so, no statute of limitations shall apply against a suit
by the injured party against the United States for compensation for
such impairment or interference in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction; but nothing in this Act shall authorize an action to enjoin such impairment or interference, if such an injunction action could not be maintained in the absence of this Act.
SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as(1)
modifying or repealing any provision of any existing Act of
Congress relative to acquisition by the United States of rights to the use
of water pursuant to State law;
(2)
permitting appropriations of water under State law which interfere with the provisions of international treaties of the United States;
(3)
amending, altering, or repealing any provision of any law which
limits the acreage in single ownership that may be served with water made
available under the reclamation law: Provided, That the same acreage
limitations that are imposed by the reclamation law shall be applicable
to water made available for irrigation under any other Federal law by
users other than Indians, pursuant to a Federal reservation or withdrawal;
(4)
affecting, impairing, diminishing, subordinating, or enlarging
(a) the rights of the United States or any States to waters under any
interstate compact or existing judicial decree, (b) any obligations of the
United States to Indians or Indian tribes, or any claim of right owned
or held by or for Indians or Indian tribes, (c) any water right heretofore
acquired by others than the United States under Federal or State law, (d)
any right to any quantity of water used for governmental purposes or
prior to the effective date of
programs of the United States at any tie
this Act, (e) any right of the United States to use water which is hereafter
lawfully initiated in the exercise of the express or necessarily implied
authority of any present or future Act of Congress or State law when such
right is initiated prior to the acquisition by others of any right to use
water pursuant to State law, (f) any preference accorded by Federal or
State law to any public agency with respect to electric power.
as the Water
Act
may be cited
SEC. 6. This at
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velopment of water resources if it will recognize and protect certain preexisting property rights to those waters. That such a requirement is not
unduly burdensome is demonstrated by considering the sections of the bill
72
itself.
Section one is designed to alleviate the problems created by the
United States' continued assertion and expansion of the reservation doctrine. In essence, it provides that reservation of public lands, either past
or future, shall not affect rights to the use of water, either navigable or
non-navigable, 73 acquired pursuant to state law in either of two factual
situations. The first situation is where water rights were established
according to state law before the reservation was established. Presumably this would in no way change existing law because the United States
has always purported to recognize rights in existence before the public
lands were withdrawn. There arc many claims which will not be protected
by this provision as a number of the federal reservations were established
early in the twentieth century.
The second part of section one is concerned with claims which were
vested pursuant to state law after a reservation was created but before
the purpose of the reserved water right, the quantity of water reserved,
and the priority date were formally established. Its purpose is to eliminate the cloud cast by the reservation doctrine on private water claims,
protecting the water user who has made an appropriation of water arising
on or flowing through a reservation before the United States formally
asserted any claim thereto. It will in effect demand that notice of United
States claims be given as to purpose, quantity and date of priority before
water claims vested under state law are taken subject thereto. The appropriative theory is clearly subscribed to with any assertion of a federal
riparian right being precluded. As it will make surplus water available
to subsequent appropriators it will serve to permit the greatest beneficial
use of water by private persons, at least until the United States takes by
prior appropriation, purchase or condemnation. For the United States
to take by prior appropriation it need only give fair notice to subsequent appropriators of the particulars of its prior claim. This is a small
burden indeed when the result is to clarify the status of water claims upon
74
which the well being of the Western States now depends.
Section two deals with the situation in which the United States
elects to claim a water right by virtue of state law, i.e. by prior appropriation, purchase or exchange. The United States does in fact acquire water
"For a detailed explanation of the bill, see 56 CONG. REC. 5976 (daily ed. Mar. 29,
1965) ; Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 34. A cogent and persuasive case for the
enactment of this legislation has been made by Sen. Kuchel and Mr. Ely and the
following arguments are principally derived from their presentations.
"It
is necessary to include navigable streams as nearly all waters are within that
classification after the decisions in United States v. Appalacian Electric Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899); Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).

"A special exemption for Indians on reservations is provided to provide a fair

effectuation of the purpose of the reservations and to sustain their productiveness.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4

16

Baxter: Western Water and the Reservation Theory - The Need for a Water Rights Settlement Act
NOTES
19651
rights under state law quite frequently 5 so it should logically be required
to comply with state laws and procedure while so doing. The United
States recently raised a contrary contention, claiming that California's
"statutory . . . procedures for the acquisition of an appropriative water
right are police regulations which are inapplicable to the United States. 7 6
Because of a previous stipulation that the United States sought to establish its claim only under California law in this case the Court did not have
to pass on the government's contention. But, section two of S. 1636 is
designed to put at rest such a theory altogether. Nothing in this section
is intended to affect the United States' procedure in claiming a water
right by virtue of its own laws such as by creating a reservation by Congressional act or by the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
A very important part of the bill is section three which would require payment by the United States for its taking of water rights, vested
under state law, when the state itself would be required to give compensation for a similar taking. Here, an extremely illogical circumstance
existing in modern water law is dealt with. This anomaly is the ability
of the United States to utilize a navigable stream or its tributaries and
destroy vested water rights without compensation if, and only if, the
77
taking furthers the navigation servitude under the commerce clause.
If the United States takes vested water rights under a Constitutional
power other than the navigation servitude of the commerce clause it must
pay compensation.7 8 It has statutorily provided for compensation under
section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 79 and section 27 of the Federal Power
Act.80 It seems illogical to permit a taking of property under the navigation servitude without compensation and to require compensation when
other federal powers are exercised. S. 1636 would simply make the fifth
amendment guarantee of just compensation complete.
On balance, this provision puts no prohibitive burden on the United
States, either procedurally or financially. For example, the cost of acquisition of private water rights for the Central Valley Project in California
amounted to less than one percent of total project costs.81 It seems
eminently more fair to place the cost of public projects upon the public
rather than upon individual users of water whose property may be made
worthless by the seizure of water rights in the name of the navigational
servitude.
T5

REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 89-808.
"United States v. Fallbrook P.U.D., 165 F. Supp. 806, 829 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
"United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Grand River
Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
'I8 nternational Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
'See the Reclamation Act of 1902, supra note 28; United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
'OFederal Power Act of 1920, supra note 29; FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
347

U.S. 239

(1954).
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Care has been taken in defining those water rights which would be
compensable under the bill, permitting no special advantages to be asserted against the federal government. Only those rights vested under
state law prior to federal taking are included. Neither are state claims
involving no more than speculative "paper rights" protected.8 2 Furthermore, the test of compensability is limited to state laws in force at the
time of passage of the bill. The possibility is thereby avoided "that a
State may hereafter create exotic water rights of some kind which the
Federal Government may have to pay for."8"
Section four of S. 1636 prescribes the manner in which state created
water rights are to be acquired and compensated for by the federal government. Within the present law there is no orderly process of condemnation adhered to in the seizing of property due to the availability of
alternative methods of taking. One of the methods, that of seizing property without instituting condemnation proceedings, places a substantial
burden upon the property owner by forcing him to assert his right to
compensation by the remedy of inverse condemnation.
The alternative methods of proceeding, condemnation and physical
s4
seizure were nicely delineated by the Court in United States v. Dow:
Broadly speaking, the United States may take property pursuant
to its power of eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter
into physical possession of property without authority of a
court order; or it can institute condemnation proceedings under
various Acts of Congress providing authority for such takings.
Under the first method-physical seizure-no condemnation proceedings are instituted, and the property owner is provided a
remedy under the Tucker Act . . . to recover just compensation.

Taking by physical seizure has come to be commonplace and has
received approval by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with water
rights.8 5 An unnecessary hardship can easily be imposed by physical seizure because the burden is shifted to the individual to seek compensation
from the United States under the Tucker Act.86 This necessitates a civil
suit in the Court of Claims whenever the amount in dispute exceeds
$10,000.81
2

It has been admitted that "the Court of Claims is a remote

United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).

The respondent

had a right granted by the state of Oklahoma to construct a hydroelectric project
at Fort Gibson on the Grand River. The United States constructed a project at
that site before the respondent had exercised his right by beginning a project.
respondent's claim to compensation for its "water power rights" at the Fort
Gibson site were denied. The frustration of plans and expectations is not a taking
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
6Kuchel, 56 CoNo. REC. 5978 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1965).
-357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958).
'Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Dugan v. Rank, 372
U.S. 609 (1963) ; City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
m°62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958).
"'(a)
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court
of Claims, of . . . . (2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States,
not exceeding $10,000 in amount. . .. "' 62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss2/4
(2) (1958). See Sochis v. United States, 266 Fed. 446 (E.D. Pa. 1920).
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jurisdiction unfamiliar to lawyers and unsympathetic to plaintiffs. ....
As many claims can be expected to be in excess of $10,000 in a land
where the value of property may be nearly totally destroyed if deprived
of water, the desirability of the United States initiating direct condemnation proceedings is evident.
.,81

Section four of S. 1636 directs the federal government, when it must
acquire a vested and compensable water right, to enter into negotiations
with the property owner in the first instance. If such negotiation fails
"the United States shall initiate and diligently prosecute proceedings to
condemn the same." Should a property owner be deprived of his water
rights without having been joined in a condemnation suit, i.e., when it
was not initially apparent that this particular individual would suffer
any damage, the right of inverse condemnation is still available to him
89
and no statute of limitations shall run against such a suit.

The effect of this provision is to lend consistency to the process of
acquiring property, to place the burden of going forward on the federal
government and to avoid undue hardship to individuals. As it specifically
denies any new causes of action for injunctive relief and does not operate
to impede or hinder the progress of federal developments, it will serve
to give greater protection to individuals without detrimental effect on
federal projects.
CONCLUSION
Water rights problems are not simple of resolution under any circumstances but such is particularly the case when they are presented on
a federal-state level. It is historically proved that the appropriation
theory is desirable in the West. Further, as water rights are real property rights, certainty is essential. On the other hand, water is a fugacious
natural resource moving inevitably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
the greatest utilization can be made of water under vast projects which
would coordinate water control and storage among widespread areas.
From a practical standpoint such extensive coordination can best be
achieved and financed by the federal government, making it undesirable
to strictly limit federal activities. The most reasonable course appears to
be to remove the inequities in the present means of developing western
waters while attempting to create a system of controls which will foster
certainty, trust, and cooperation between state and federal agencies. In
this regard, it is hoped that a greater awareness among the citizens of
the western states of the problems existing in present water law will
result in support for a more expeditious and productive management of
one of this country's most critical natural resources.
ROBERT T. BAXTER.
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Goldberg, Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 34, at 125.

8The present
statute of limitations applicable to the Court of Claims is six years after
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